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Oversight Bodies Across the Atlantic: 
The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the US 




  ‘Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?’ asked the Roman poet Juvenal – ‘who will watch the 
watchers, who will guard the guardians?’
1 As legislative and regulatory processes around the 
globe progressively put greater emphasis on impact assessment and accountability, 
(Verschuuren and van Gestel 2009, Hahn and Tetlock 2007), we ask: who oversees the 
regulators? Although regulation can often be necessary and beneficial, it can also impose its 
own costs. As a result, many governments have embraced, or are considering embracing, 
regulatory oversight--frequently relying on economic analysis as a tool of evaluation.We are 
especially interested in the emergence over the last four decades of a new set of institutional 
actors, the Regulatory Oversight Bodies (ROBs). These bodies tend to be located in the 
executive (or sometimes the legislative) branch of government. They review the flow of new 
regulations using impact assessment and benefit-cost analysis, and they sometimes also 
appraise existing regulations to measure and reduce regulatory burdens. Through these 
procedures of regulatory review, ROBs have become an integral aspect not only of regulatory 
reform programs in many countries, but also of their respective administrative systems. 
Although most academic attention focuses on the analytical tools used to improve the 
quality of legislation, such as regulatory impact assessment (RIA) or benefit-cost analysis, 
this chapter instead identifies the key concepts and issues surrounding the establishment and 
operation of ROBs across governance systems. It does so by examining and comparing the 
oversight mechanisms that have been established in the United States and in the EU and by 
                                                 
1 Juvenal was asking who would oversee those assigned to guard the queen’s fidelity during the king’s absence, 
lest those guards betray their own duty. See Satires, Book 2: Satire VI, 6.029-34. Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1567691
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critically looking into their origins, rationales, mandates, institutional designs and scope of 
oversight. 
 
1. The rationale for the establishment of ROBs 
  1.1 Why oversee the regulators? 
  Wherever societies engage in economic activity (which is to say everywhere), demand 
arises for regulation by the state to curb the undesirable impacts of that activity. In the real 
world of imperfect markets, regulations can be necessary to correct market failures such as 
externalities (e.g. health, safety and environmental risks), asymmetric information (e.g. in 
financial or labor markets), and market power (e.g. entry barriers), as well as correcting other 
problems such as unfair discrimination.  
  Although regulation can solve such social problems, it can also impose its own problems, 
including compliance costs, inhibition of innovation, ancillary risks, and rent-seeking. 
Regulators may make mistakes, may choose poorly designed regulations, may neglect social 
goals other than their own narrow mission (Breyer 1993),
 2 may neglect the adverse impacts 
of their decisions, may aggrandise their own power, or may serve the interests of narrow 
groups rather than promoting broader public well-being.
 (Kolko 1965, Ackerman and Hassler 
1981). Regulators may pursue policies that reduce some risks while introducing new risks or 
shifting risks to other populations (risk-risk tradeoffs), where regulators are hampered by 
limited information, bounded decision domains, or the omitted voice of the affected 
populations (Graham and Wiener 1995). Political scientists and institutional economists have 
emphasised that in democracies, government decisions are not taken by a single ruler but 
instead represent a complex aggregation of preferences advocated by specific interest groups 
and often mediated through contending institutions. Because learning about issues and 
expressing political voice are costly, the shared general interests of the public at large may go 
underrepresented while the narrow interests of pressure groups are trumpeted (Olson 1971, 
Wiener and Richman 2010).
3  
  As a result, wherever states deploy regulation, demand arises for oversight of the 
regulatory system to reduce the costs and side effects of regulation, promote efficiency in 
standard-setting and instrument choice, encourage consistency and transparency, ensure 
                                                 
2 This may occur, for example, where regulators are pushed by legislatures or advocacy groups, such as 
consumer and environmental groups, to regulate despite (or overlooking) the social costs, or where regulators 
overestimate the risk to be regulated. See Breyer (1993). 
3 A classic on this point is Olson (1971).  For further discussion of the political economy of regulatory design, 
see Wiener and Barak Richman (2010). DRAFT — Not for quotation without permission   3 
 
   
accountability, and improve the overall social outcomes of regulation. Regulatory oversight, 
particularly oversight by a centralised governmental body, has increasingly been seen as an 
effective mechanism for improving regulation. Regulatory oversight can be defined as 
‘hierarchical supervision of regulatory action by executive and legislative actors.’ (Lindseth, 
Aman and Raul 2008:3).  
  1.2 How to oversee the regulators?  
  The aim of regulatory oversight is both democratic and technocratic: to enhance the 
accountability of regulatory agencies to democratically elected officials, and to use analytic 
methods to improve the overall social outcomes of regulation by reducing the costs and side 
effects and increasing the benefits. Regulatory oversight, as it is generally carried out, uses 
several analytical tools which are heavily informed by economic analysis. The analytic tools 
that are generally employed have been discussed at length in the academic literature (Revesz 
and Livermore 2008, Graham 2008, Adler and Posner 2001, Adler and Posner 2006), and also 
in several OECD reports (Deighton-Smith 2007, 2006, OECD 2009). These tools include: 
impact assessment (IA) of proposed legislation
4; benefit-cost analysis and cost-effectiveness 
analysis (Graham 2008, Revesz and Livermore 2008, Wiener 2006);
5 risk-risk tradeoff 
analysis (Graham and Wiener 1995, Revesz and Livermore 2008);
6 and scientific analyses 
(Bagley and Revesz 2006).
7  Other tasks may involve simplification of existing legislation 
and regulation (through codification, recasting and repeal) (Beslier and Lavaggi 2006); 
consultation procedures on drafting proposals
8; screening and withdrawal of pending 
proposals
9; and monitoring and reducing administrative burdens.
10 
  1.3 Who oversees the regulators?  
  The analytical tools and methodologies that are typically employed in regulatory 
oversight could, in principle, be employed by a variety of actors, including legislatures or 
                                                 
4 IA can be defined as the process of systematic analysis of the likely impacts of a policy or intervention by 
public authorities.  It may employ each of the analytic tools noted here.   An IA also refers to the report or 
document containing such an analysis.  
5 While BCA compares benefits and costs, seeking to maximize net benefits, cost-effectiveness seeks to 
minimize cost for a given objective or maximize benefits for a given cost.  For further discussion of degrees of 
quantification in IA, see Graham (2008), Revesz & Livermore (2008), and Wiener (2006). 
6 Including both ancillary harms and ancillary benefits. See Graham & Wiener (1995), Revesz & Livermore 
(2008). 
7 See Bagley & Revesz (2006) (advocating centralized co-ordination of agency science).  The US Information 
Quality Act of 2001 calls for centralized review of the quality of agency data and publications. 
8 Commission communication ‘General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties 
by the Commission’ COM(2002) 704 (hereinafter ‘minimum standards’). See, on this initiative, Obradovic and 
Vizcaino (2006). 
9 For an insightful analysis on this initiative in the EU, see Allio (2008). 
10 See Commission Communication ‘Action programme for reducing administrative burdens in the EU’ 
COM(2007) 23 final. DRAFT — Not for quotation without permission   4 
 
   
their accountability arms, courts, auditors, executive officials, advisory bodies, review 
commissions, and non-governmental organizations. The distinctive institutional development 
of the past four decades in the US and during the past decade in Europe has been the 
emergence of regulatory oversight bodies (ROBs) to ‘watch the watchers.’  A typical ROB is 
an office in the executive branch (center of government) charged with supervising regulation 
government-wide. Some countries also have ROBs in the parliament or legislature. As shown 
below, both the US and the EU centralize regulatory oversight functions within the executive 
branch, though under different institutional designs. 
  One key attribute of any ROB is expertise, in the form of a trained professional staff 
capable of undertaking technical evaluation of regulatory impacts and options. These staff 
may be economists, but also may include experts in other fields of social science, law and 
policy, life science and physical science. As Adam Smith observed, expertise can be an 
antidote to passion – to politicised distortions of regulation – or at least a means to reveal and 
make transparent the significant impacts, tradeoffs, and alternatives of regulatory choices and 
to inform decision makers and the public of the promises and pitfalls of regulation. By 
contrast, any ROB lacking expertise or headed by a non-expert political appointee may simply 
exercise politicised influence over expert regulators and thereby undercut the ROB’s 
perceived legitimacy.
11  
  A second key attribute of any ROB is political accountability, such as accountability to 
the center of government (e.g., the President or Prime Minister) or to a powerful ministry 
(such as budget/finance), to ensure that regulation serves the program of these high-level 
officials who are in turn accountable to the electorate. (Lindseth, Aman and Raul 2008, Bickel 
1986, Tushnet 1995, Ackerman 1993, 1998).
12 Political accountability enhances the ability of 
ROBs to influence regulators who also have their own political constituencies. Just as 
regulators need oversight, so too ROBs warrant oversight, by the President or Prime Minister, 
by the legislature or parliament, perhaps by courts,
13 and by the public.  
                                                 
11 Judicial oversight generally involves generalist professionals who are not experts in one regulatory topic, but 
who are experts in administrative law, and who are ideally independent, maintaining their perceived legitimacy 
by being shielded from political influence via secure job tenure (though in reality judges may also be influenced 
by political affiliations). 
12 See Lindseth, Aman, & Raul (2008). Judicial review is typically not accountable to the electorate, but rather 
derives its legitimacy from its independence from politics. Its influence is generally defined as counter-
majoritarian. 
13 In the US, OMB/OIRA has not been subject to judicial review; Revesz & Livermore propose that OIRA’s 
issuance of key oversight guidelines should be subject to judicial review similar to rulemaking by regulatory 
agencies.  Revesz & Livermore, (2008:172). DRAFT — Not for quotation without permission   5 
 
   
  Any ROB faces possible tensions between these two key attributes. Expert technocratic 
criteria for regulation may or may not coincide with political democratic criteria. That is, the 
President’s or Prime Minister’s (or legislature’s) policy program may differ from the experts’ 
advice regarding the optimal policy (Shapiro 2006, Graham 2007b). In such cases, the ROB 
may need to explain its expert technical analysis to a political leader with a different priority 
and try to convince the leader to change course, or the ROB may help make the impacts and 
tradeoffs transparent while recognizing that the political leader’s priority will override the 
ROB’s expert technical analysis. 
  The ROB may have both a need for independence from political micro-management, to 
assure its neutrality and technocratic objectivity, and simultaneously a need to be close to 
power in order to have authority over other ministries and to carry forward the President’s (or 
Prime Minister’s) regulatory agenda (E. Kagan 2001). In some cases, this tension can become 
acute.  
  Like any government body, a ROB may seek external social support to maintain its own 
budget and influence. If that support comes predominantly from advocacy groups on one side 
of a debate (e.g. business groups), this may compromise the perceived legitimacy of the 
ROB’s advice. Meanwhile, ROBs may also need to have their own external advisory bodies 
to offer useful insight and feedback, both on advances in technical analytic methods and on 
emerging issues in regulatory policy (OECD 2007a).  
  These internal and external tensions are partly mediated through the rules for the 
appointment and removal of ROB officials. Therefore, an analysis of ROBs needs to address 
questions such as: Who has the power to appoint and remove the head of the ROB? How does 
the power to appoint/remove officials affect the performance of the ROB? What kind of 
expertise does the ROB have, or should it have? How does the ROB use its expertise and its 
political position to influence regulatory quality and decisions? Should political officials 
instruct the ROB on particular regulatory decisions (and do they)? These are some of the 
questions that we address in the following sections, focusing on the US and EU experiences 
with ROBs. 
 
2. Origins of ROBs  
  A brief historical perspective can help to illustrate the origins and objectives of these 
bodies in OECD countries. In the past, countries with a Roman law tradition set up forms of 
ROBs, as part of Councils of State, as in France (Robineau and Truchet 2002) and Italy 
(Caretti and De Siervo 1996). These bodies served as advisors to the government on the DRAFT — Not for quotation without permission   6 
 
   
legality of regulatory decisions. They were also the superior level of the administrative courts, 
so they also exercised an adjudicative role meant to protect governments and avoid litigation 
in the civil courts regarding specific regulations. For example, in France after the Revolution, 
the Conseil d’Etat and the system of administrative courts were designed to shield the 
administrative state from being unduly constrained by the separate system of civil courts; the 
civil court judges were viewed as more sympathetic to the monarchy while the administrative 
courts were meant to be more sympathetic to the legislature and to its efforts to redistribute 
power and wealth in France after the Revolution. Today, the Conseil d’Etat, acting as both a 
court of appeals for the administrative courts and a supervisory body for the administrative 
state, brings significant expertise to bear on the legality of regulatory decisions (Breyer 1993 
Part III). However, it does not review impact assessments of proposed new regulations 
prepared by regulatory agencies (Bouder 2008, Trosa 2008).  
  Modern ROBs, established since the 1970s, especially in common law countries such as 
the USA and UK, but also in other countries such as the Netherlands, and in the European 
Union, have a different origin. They were mainly created in response to stagnating economic 
conditions; a rising tide of regulation of health, safety and environmental risks; an 
accumulated array of economic regulation of sectors such as banking, communications, and 
transportation; and an academic literature on both the need for and problems with regulation.  
  2.1 The origin of the US Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs  
  In the late 18
th century, the US Constitution’s strategy of checks and balances among 
branches of government was designed to avoid the concentration of power that existed in 
monarchic regimes. By the 20
th century, that foundational strategy continued to animate the 
evolution of regulatory oversight. The US Administrative Procedure Act (APA) enacted in 
1946 was a response to the ‘New Deal’ expansion of federal regulation in the 1930s and 
1940s. In turn, the US Executive Orders on regulatory impact assessment issued beginning in 
the 1970s were, in part, a response to the ‘Great Society’ expansion of health and 
environmental legislation in the 1960s and 1970s, as well as the slowing economy, 
accumulated economic regulation, and academic analysis. In 1978, President Jimmy Carter, a 
Democrat, issued Executive Order (EO) 12044, requiring economic analysis of new 
regulations, and he created the Regulatory Analysis Review Group, an interagency working 
group that gathered when needed to review these economic analyses. Then in 1980, the US 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) was established by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980. OIRA was thus 
located in the Executive Office of the President. The Administrator of OIRA is appointed by DRAFT — Not for quotation without permission   7 
 
   
the President and, since the 1986 amendments to the Paperwork Reduction Act (Pub. L. 99-
591), is subject to confirmation by the Senate. OIRA has approximately 50 expert non-
political staff. Whereas the RARG had been an interagency group that met on occasion, OIRA 
is a standing centralized expert oversight body.  
  When Ronald Reagan (a Republican) became President in 1981, he promptly issued 
Executive Order (EO) 12291 (February 1981), formally giving OIRA the role and authority of 
a ROB. The Reagan EO required agencies to conduct regulatory impact assessments using 
benefit-cost analysis, to ensure that regulations’ benefits ‘outweigh’ their costs, and to submit 
those IAs to OIRA for review, while giving OIRA the power to ‘return’ an unsatisfactory 
regulation or IA to the agency. Some viewed the EO as an intrusion on the agencies’ duty to 
carry out statutory instructions from the Congress; but the EO expressly provided that it did 
not override statutes, and others replied that in any case the President still has the authority to 
manage the executive branch. It also received criticism from those who saw it as anti-
regulatory. President George H.W. Bush continued OIRA’s role under EO 12291.  
After Bill Clinton, a Democrat, became President in 1993, there was much speculation that he 
might issue a new EO diminishing OIRA’s role in regulatory oversight. Instead, Clinton’s EO 
12866 (September 1993) reaffirmed the basic role of OIRA in reviewing agencies’ policy 
proposals and regulatory IAs using benefit-cost analysis. It replaced the word ‘outweigh’ with 
the word ‘justify,’ thereby emphasizing the importance of qualitative as well as quantitative 
criteria, and orienting benefit-cost analysis to be ‘a tool not a rule’ – informing the considered 
judgments of publicly accountable officials, not dictating decisions arithmetically. Clinton’s 
EO also broadened the scope of the impacts to be considered in IAs to include distributional 
impacts and ancillary impacts, and enhanced the transparency of OIRA review. The Clinton 
administration also issued best practice guidelines on preparing IAs.  
  George W. Bush was elected president in the contentious 2000 election, and soon 
speculation arose again that he might issue a new EO enhancing OIRA’s oversight role. 
Instead, Bush retained Clinton’s EO 12866 (with only minor modifications made in his 
second term, such as adding coverage of agency ‘guidance documents’ through EO 13422 in 
January 2007). During the Bush administration, OIRA also issued guidelines on the conduct 
of IA, notably through Circular A-4 in September 2003.  
  Just after his inauguration as President in January 2009, Barack Obama rescinded his 
predecessor’s EO 13422,
14 but left in place EO 12866 as issued by President Clinton. At the 
                                                 
14 74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (Feb. 4, 2009). DRAFT — Not for quotation without permission   8 
 
   
same time, President Obama also issued a request for recommendations on a new EO on 
regulatory oversight, listing several topics to be addressed, but implying that he would 
continue the basic approach of requiring regulatory review by OIRA.
15  As of January 2010, 
he had not yet issued a new EO. 
  Thus, the creation and role of OIRA reflects a bipartisan consensus – at least among the 
US Presidents of the last four decades – that the executive branch needs tools to oversee the 
regulatory state and manage its choices, employing both expert analysis and political 
accountability, regardless of which political party is in power (E. Kagan 2001).  
  2.2 The origin of the EU’s Impact Assessment Board 
  In Europe, regulatory review was not formally established until after 2000. Nonetheless, 
this history reflects the same pattern seen in the US, in which the ROB is created in response 
to the growth of the regulatory state.  
  The European Union (EU) launched its formal impact assessment (IA) procedure in 2002 
as a regulatory review system within the European Commission. This process scrutinizes the 
quality of IAs conducted by the Commission services (directorates general, or DGs) on 
proposals for new policies. From 2002 to 2006, these IAs were shared among the 
Commission; then in November 2006, a ROB was established to oversee the IA process:  the 
EU Impact Assessment Board (IAB), located in the office of the Secretariat-General of the 
European Commission. The IAB grew out of the ‘Better Regulation’ initiative (Wiener 2006), 
which was spurred by the Lisbon Agenda and the Mandelkern Report of 2001.
16 The 
Commission issued Impact Assessment Guidelines in 2003, revised them in 2005, and 
updated them in 2006, before they were replaced by new ones in 2009.
17  The IAB’s primary 
role is to oversee the quality of the IAs produced by the Directorates-General (DGs) when the 
latter propose new policies. The IAB is a five-member board made up of representatives from 
several DGs and chaired by the Deputy Secretary-General; this structure is more akin to the 
interagency RARG than to the standing body of OIRA with its single Administrator and 
permanent staff. 
                                                 
15 President Barack Obama, Memorandum of January 30, 2009 – Regulatory Review , 74 Fed. Reg. 5977 
(published Feb. 3, 2009).  President Obama directed the the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in 
consultation with representatives of regulatory agencies, to produce within 100 days a set of recommendations 
for a new Executive Order on regulatory review.  OMB then invited public comment, 74 Fed. Reg. 8819 (Feb. 
26, 2009), and more than 180 public comments were received by April 20, 2009.  These memoranda and the 
public comments received are posted at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_regmatters/ . 
16 The final Mandelkern report on Better Regulation was finalised in February 2001 and published on 13 
November 2001. 
17 European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, SEC(2009) 92. DRAFT — Not for quotation without permission   9 
 
   
  As in the US, albeit with a different institutional history and structure, the EU Better 
Regulation initiative and its Impact Assessment program, including the creation of the IAB, 
have been in part a response to the growth of EU-level regulation, notably following the 1987 
Single European Act and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (Alemanno 2008:45-46). The EU’s 
adoption of the IA review process was also a way to support the Lisbon strategy for economic 
advance.
18 The setting up of the IAB drew lessons from the US, but also from the UK and 
Swedish examples, where significant improvements in the regulatory frameworks and 
deregulation had been seen as associated with renewed economic growth (Radaelli and De 
Francesco 2007). As in the US, regulatory oversight achieved a kind of bipartisan consensus 
in the EU:  The EU Better Regulation initiative and the IA process have been supported 
through varying presidencies of the Commission, including both Presidents Romano Prodi 
and José Manuel Barroso, and have also been endorsed by the Council of the EU.
19  
  2.3 Other examples of ROBs 
  These trends have been mirrored in many other countries and jurisdictions, gradually 
spreading across almost all OECD countries. For example, the UK has had a Regulatory 
Impact Unit, followed by a Better Regulation Executive, with an advisory body called the 
Better Regulation Task Force; these were succeeded by the Better Regulation Commission in 
2006, and in turn by the Risk and Regulation Advisory Council in 2008, as well as 
accompanied by additional scrutiny from the National Audit Office, the Panel for Regulatory 
Accountability, and the House of Commons. The Netherlands program to reduce 
administrative costs was overseen by the Inter-Ministerial Project Team (IPAL) in the 
Ministry of Finance, with external scrutiny by the Advisory Board on Administrative Burdens 
(ACTAL) (OECD 2007b). Countries such as Mexico, with COFEMER following on to the 
previous example of UDE, and Korea have also set up ROBs, influenced by examples in other 
OECD countries and by advice from the OECD. At the EU level, the European Court of 
Auditors (an institution created to audit the EU budget) has also indicated some interest in 
performing a role in regulatory oversight. 
                                                 
18 The EU Better Regulation strategy is a centrepiece of the renewed 'Lisbon Strategy', which aimed at turning 
Europe into the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010. See European 
Commission’s ‘Partnership for Growth and Jobs’ - the renewed 'Lisbon Strategy' launched in Spring 2005.  
19 Council of the European Union, Conclusions of the Competitiveness Council on Better Regulation, December 
3-4, 2009. DRAFT — Not for quotation without permission   10 
 
   
3. Structure: constitutional and institutional design of ROBs 
  ROBs could in principle be located in any branch of government. Thus, they might be 
established within the executive/administrative branch (for example, as an interagency 
working group; as an office of the president or prime minister; as an independent government 
watchdog office such as an auditor or ombudsman or inspector general; or at a government 
ministry for reform of regulation or state reform); within the legislative branch (as a 
legislative committee or a technical body attached to the legislature); or within the judicial 
branch (indeed judicial review functions as a kind of ROB, with the authority to reject 
regulatory decisions, though typically without the expertise and routine oversight role of an 
executive branch ROB). The function of ROBs may also be carried out, in part, by external 
advisory groups, national academies of science, or other external nongovernmental actors 
such as advocacy groups, think tanks, academic researchers, and the news media. Although 
such groups may be expert and may conduct and publicize their reviews of regulatory IAs, 
they typically lack the authority to determine choices by the regulators. Within a multi-level 
governance system such as a federal republic or supranational union, the tasks of ROBs may 
also be exercised by the member states of the union or federation. 
  The choice among these locations is always a question of comparative institutional 
analysis: Which institution is best equipped and best placed to perform oversight in each 
system of governance? In making such choices, there may be tradeoffs among criteria such as 
expertise, authority, transparency, and political accountability. Different constitutional 
structures may thus warrant different optimal locations.  
  3.1 The location of OIRA in the US structure of government  
  In the US, the location of the main ROB, OIRA, is in the Executive Office of the 
President. The OIRA Administrator is appointed by the President, with confirmation by the 
Senate. The OIRA Administrator reports to the Director of Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB), and then to the President.  
  The location of OIRA reflects the horizontal separation of powers in the US federal 
government. OIRA enables the president to manage the regulatory powers deployed by the 
legislature (the Congress). In response to New Deal expansion of federal regulatory state, the 
courts were asked by petitioners to undertake judicial review of agency regulation. In 1946 
Congress, with the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), gave courts the 
authority  to enforce provisions that required notice and public comment when agencies make 
rules, and to be sure that regulations are not ‘arbitrary or capricious’. Three decades later, in 
response to the Great Society expansion of federal regulation in the 1960s, the courts DRAFT — Not for quotation without permission   11 
 
   
intensified their review by allowing increased access to the courts for advocacy groups and by 
adopting the ‘hard look’ doctrine in the 1970s. But active judicial review of agency action 
was seen by presidents as insufficient, because judicial review is episodic, conducted by non-
expert judges without staff resources, not always subject to benefit-cost criteria, and not 
accountable to the president’s policy agenda. Meanwhile, federal regulatory agencies were a 
contested terrain in the US constitutional structure: they conduct executive branch functions 
(with heads appointed by the President with Senate confirmation), and are also agents of the 
Congress exercising delegated legislative power, and they may perform adjudicatory 
functions as well.
20  
  Although OIRA’s initial focus was on paperwork reduction – reducing the administrative 
burden of government requests for information –it soon took on a role in overseeing 
regulation. OIRA has substantially, although not exclusively, been oriented as a way for the 
executive to check or shape legislative (Congressional) pressure to regulate. But OIRA 
operates only at the second stage, reviewing agencies’ implementing regulations, not 
reviewing the legislation initially enacted by the Congress itself. OIRA review has historically 
been aimed primarily (though not exclusively) at countering the agencies’ mission-driven 
tunnel vision, to check proposed regulations whose benefits do not justify their costs (or to 
help revise those proposals to better maximize net benefits) – though some argue that public 
choice theory implies that agencies will regulate too little.
21  One response to the latter 
concern has been the innovation of ‘prompt’ letters, which were introduced, interestingly, in 
the George W. Bush administration, and which enable OIRA to ask an agency to consider 
adopting a new regulation (Graham 2007a).  
  The US has no IA process nor ROB to oversee Congressional legislation itself. 
Compared to the courts and the executive branch, Congress has played a smaller role in 
regulatory review. Congress holds periodic committee hearings on specific policy areas. The 
General Accountability Office (GAO) attached to the Congress issues occasional reports on 
regulatory matters. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates the impacts of new 
laws on federal government spending and revenues, but not usually on private sector costs and 
benefits. Congress did enact the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA 1995), calling for 
nonbinding analyses of new regulations; the Congressional Review Act, authorizing expedited 
                                                 
20 Some US federal agencies are called ‘independent,’ because the president’s power to remove the agency head 
is restricted; it remains an unresolved question whether the president can require those agencies to comply with 
the IA process and OIRA oversight. 
21 Compare Breyer (1993) (worrying about agencies’ tunnel vision and excessive regulation), with Revesz & 
Livermore (2008) (worrying that agencies may regulate too little).    DRAFT — Not for quotation without permission   12 
 
   
passage by Congress of a bill to rescind an agency regulation (though still requiring passage 
by both houses of Congress and signature by the president, hence rarely used); and a law 
calling for annual reports by OMB/OIRA to the Congress on the aggregate costs and benefits 
of federal regulation over the last decade. But, in general, after having created OIRA, 
Congress has not strongly favored regulatory oversight – especially of its own legislative 
enactments. Congress has no ROB of its own equipped to carry out such a function. In the 
1980s, some in Congress resisted the Presidency’s efforts to oversee regulation through 
OMB/OIRA. The Congress considered, but not did enact, broad regulatory reform legislation 
in the mid-1990s. Congress even de-funded its own expert advisory bodies, the Office of 
Technology Assessment (OTA) and the Administrative Conference of the US (ACUS). 
  3.2 The location of the IAB in the EU structure of government  
  The EU has a hybrid system. In contrast to the US system in which the roles of the 
principals (the Congress, the Presidency) and the agents (the federal agencies) are fairly easy 
to identify, with lateral oversight by the courts and internal oversight by the President’s 
executive office (OIRA), in the EU the roles of principals and agents are more fragmented 
and interwoven across several institutions. These include the European Commission 
exercising internal oversight through its Secretariat-General, its inter-service consultation 
practices, and its new IAB; the Council of the EU; the European Parliament; and the member 
states; with lateral oversight by bodies such as the European Court of Justice, the European 
Court of Auditors (which reviews the budget), and the European Ombudsman (which can 
investigate ‘maladministration’) (Lindseth, Aman & Raul 2008,  Alemanno 2009).
22 Indeed, in 
the last ten years the European Commission has undertaken a sweeping effort to introduce 
better regulatory oversight mechanisms, mainly to further European economic 
competitiveness.
23  
The ROB in the EU that most closely corresponds to the US OMB/OIRA is the European 
Commission’s relatively new Impact Assessment Board (IAB), created in late 2006, and 
located in the Commission’s Secretariat-General under the direct authority of the Commission 
President. The IAB is composed of five high-level officials, in particular, the Deputy 
Secretary-General of the Commission, and four Directors coming from four directorates 
general: DG Enterprise and Industry, DG Environment, DG Employment, Social Affairs and 
                                                 
22 Under Article 228 of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (former 
Article 195 EC), the Ombudsman may investigate complaints from EU citizens in instances of 
maladministration, ‘with the exception of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance acting in their 
judicial role’. 
23  See Lofstedt et al. (2008:135) (observing that the EU has done more on regulatory reform from 1998-2008 
than it had in all the years from 1956-1997) and Wiener (2006). DRAFT — Not for quotation without permission   13 
 
   
Equal Opportunities, and DG Economic and Financial Affairs (Alemanno 2008).
24  The IAB 
has some expert staff, but the five members meet periodically; and the DGs represented on the 
IAB may be proponents of policies being reviewed by the IAB. The IAB’s location in the 
Commission is facially similar to the location of US OIRA within the executive branch, but 
the European Commission’s distinctive role as the sole institution empowered to introduce  
legislation gives its IA process oversight of legislative, rather than exclusively administrative, 
action. Thus, the Commission has created an internal, quasi-specialised, executive/legislative 
ROB to oversee effective compliance by the Commission with the IA requirements. 
  3.3 Comparing oversight structures across the Atlantic 
  The different approach to the structure of oversight in the EU system compared to the US 
derives from the different structures of governance. In the US, legislation begins in the 
Congress, a political body, which enacts statutes and can thereby create regulatory agencies 
and delegate tasks to these agencies. The agencies possess technocratic expertise that the 
Congress lacks, and Congress often relies on the agencies to determine essential issues such 
as the appropriate level of protection of health and environment. OIRA in turn is also a highly 
technical body, staffed by professional experts that reports to the President. The heads of the 
agencies and the head of OIRA are all appointed by the President, but nonetheless it is 
sometimes a challenge for the presidency to steer the policy direction of the agencies, each of 
which has its own constituencies among the public and in Congressional committees, and 
some of whose heads are legally shielded from being easily removed by the President. 
Regulatory oversight through OIRA is one means for the president to manage the multi-
headed regulatory state (E. Kagan 2001). Thus in the US, OIRA is a politically accountable 
body that exercises technocratic review of regulatory power delegated by Congress to the 
federal agencies.  
In the EU, by contrast, legislation begins exclusively in the Commission, which is 
mainly a technical executive body, although the political accountability and authority of the 
Commission’s president is growing. (The Commission’s president is not popularly elected 
like the US president, but rather is appointed by the European Council and subject to a vote of 
approval by the European Parliament.)  ‘Agencies’ such as the European Environment 
Agency or European Food Safety Authority exist in the EU, but, being judicially barred from 
                                                 
24 To know more on the IAB, see Alemanno, 2008. See also the Commission Staff Working Paper ‘Impact 
Assessment Board – Report for the year 2007’ COM(2008)32final. DRAFT — Not for quotation without permission   14 
 
   
exercising delegated regulatory authority,
25 their main function is to engage in preparatory 
executive acts under the direct Commission oversight.
26  Regulatory power is exercised by the 
DGs (such as DG Environment), subject to their proposals for Directives and Regulations 
being adopted by the full Commission. The Commission proposes new legislative initiatives 
to the Council and the Parliament, both political bodies. The Council is made up of the 
relevant ministers of the member states – a kind of legislature composed of national-level 
executives – and the Parliament is a large legislature composed of elected representatives, 
seated by party not by member state. The adage is that ‘the Commission proposes, the Council 
disposes.’  Yet these institutions also operate in a complex relationship of delegation and 
cooperation, the framework of ‘comitology,’ i.e., the committee system which oversees the 
delegated acts implemented by the European Commission (Saurer 2010).  
  Moreover, within the Commission and its DGs, many staff and observers point to a 
tradition of collaborative harmony or collegiality rather than adversarial or hierarchical 
relations; the ‘College of Commissioners’ (each from a different member state, and appointed 
together as a slate) makes its decisions in a consensual style. This emphasis on harmony and 
collegiality may derive from several factors, among them the original purpose of the 
European Community to heal and unify the continent. This may also be related to the 
substantially smaller and more close-knit size of the Commission compared to the larger US 
multi-agency administration. This collegiality within the Commission stands in contrast to the 
more hierarchical relationship in the US executive branch between OIRA (and the White 
House generally) and the federal agencies it oversees. Although the IAB has the power to 
comment on the quality of the IA accompanying a DGs policy proposal, the IAB does not 
(yet) have the explicit power to reject a policy proposal – that power is held by the College of 
Commissioners as a whole. Perhaps the IAB’s power to influence policy decisions will 
accrete over time, as the President of the Commission becomes more powerful (an issue 
currently in flux with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in late 2009) and as technocratic 
review of regulatory policy becomes more customary in Europe. Even today internal debates 
do occur. Whatever its origins, this collegial style may help explain the more limited powers 
of the IAB, compared to OIRA, to reject or ‘return’ impact assessments and policy proposals 
                                                 
25 Although the European Court of Justice recognised the need for delegated legislation in Meroni (case 9/56, 
Meroni v. High Authority), it limited significantly the possibility of delegating regulatory authority. The idea is 
that agency decisions should not entail any use of regulatory discretion beyond a purely technical evaluation of 
the applications against fixed criteria. For a recent critique of the ‘Meroni doctrine’ see Majone (2010). 
26 For an introduction to the EU Agencies, Communication from the Commission, The operating framework for 
the European Regulatory Agencies, COM(2002) 718 final; Interinstitutional Agreement on the operating 
framework for the European regulatory agencies, presented by the EC Commission, 25/02/05, COM(2005) 59 
final; Gilardi (2002:873), Chiti (2000). DRAFT — Not for quotation without permission   15 
 
   
to the agencies (Allio 2007b:5). On the other hand, the persuasive influence of the IAB’s 
report may induce the proponent DG to improve its IA or its policy (Alemanno 2008:70). The 
Secretariat-General may also issue a negative opinion on a policy.
27 In the US, by contrast, 
there is a strong tradition of using adversarial debate to test and shape decisions, not only in 
courts but also in the executive and legislative branches (R. Kagan 2001).  
  Thus in the EU, the IAB reviews proposals from its own technical administrative branch 
of government (the Commission), in a setting that softens overt discord, before those 
proposals go to the political branches for assent (and then often to the member states for 
implementation). The structural role of regulatory ‘oversight’ is thus different in the EU, 
where legislation comes initially from the technical branch and where the Commission 
internally follows a collegial structure and style, than it is in the US. In the US, legislation 
comes initially from the most political branch, and the agencies occupy a position that, 
functionally at least, bridges between the Congress and the presidency. In the US, the ROB is 
a mechanism for the presidency to manage the administrative state through technocratic 
expertise in a hierarchical structure. 
 3.4  Plural  ROBs 
  Oversight need not be limited to a single ROB in each national or supranational 
administrative system. Plural oversight could involve several ROBs, each located in a 
different part of the regulatory structure. Indeed the US has not only OIRA in the executive 
(and direct presidential power itself), but also interagency consultation, potent judicial review, 
numerous scientific advisory bodies, and always the possibility of a regulation being 
mandated or blocked by act of Congress, as well as a system of cooperative federalism with 
the 50 states. Meanwhile, the EU has the new IAB in the Commission, but also aspects of 
oversight exercised by several other institutions including the inter-service consultation 
among the DGs, as well as the Council, the Parliament, the Ombudsman, the Court of 
Auditors, and the Court of Justice, and the 27 member states themselves. The optimal number 
and location of ROBs seems likely to differ from system to system and to depend on each 
polity’s own constitutional features.  
  Oversight can also be located in networks of internal or external communities of experts. 
For example, interagency working groups can supply oversight. These include the former 
RARG in the Carter administration, and interagency consultation on proposed actions as 
under the EU system of Inter-Service Consultation, and the US system of interagency 
                                                 
27 See European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, updated March 2006, pp.14-15. DRAFT — Not for quotation without permission   16 
 
   
consultation on IAs submitted to OIRA.
28 The European Commission IAB itself builds on the 
pre-existing system of inter-service consultation on DGs’ impact assessments (Alemanno 
2008, Allio 2007b). Additionally, external or quasi-governmental networks of 
nongovernmental experts such as science advisory bodies and public comment can provide 
influential advice (Jasanoff 1990, Morgan & Peha 2003, Graham 1991).  
  One can, of course, always ask if such external bodies actually influence government 
decisions. ROBs themselves may have external advisory bodies. For example the UK Better 
Regulation (BR) Executive has had its BR Task Force, which then became the BR 
Commission, and is now being converted to the Risk and Regulation Advisory Council 
(OECD 2007a, chapter 3). Neither the US OIRA nor the EU IAB has a standing external 
advisory body, but such an external body has been called for by some members of the 
Commission
29 and has recently been required by the European Parliament.
30  Such calls could 
soon be amplified, should the European courts show any readiness to conduct judicial review 
of the EU Institutions’ compliance with Better Regulation procedures.
31 
 
4. Mandate and tasks 
 4.1  Mandate 
  The mandate of any ROB is usually set forth in its enabling document. Its mission may 
be limited to quality control of  impact assessments and other evaluative tools, or it may have 
the authority to inhibit undesirable policies (e.g. via ‘return’ letters), promote desirable 
policies (e.g. via ‘prompt’ letters), and conduct ex post (retrospective) evaluation toward 
policy revision. Ancillary missions may include also capacity building, training, and strategic 
planning of future policies. 
  The type of authority accorded to an ROB may depend importantly on the source of its 
authority, that is, on the institution that created the ROB. For example, authority conferred by 
a statute enacted by the legislature may have broader application to reviews of future 
                                                 
28 This also includes interagency consultation on Environmental IAs submitted to EPA and CEQ under NEPA, 
and interagency consultation on biological opinions submitted to DOI/FWS under the Endangered Species Act. 
29 Keynote Speech by Commissioner G. Verheugen, 'Better Legislation in the EU', delivered at the European 
Conference on Subsidiarity during the Austrian Presidency, 19 April 2006 (‘what we need is the independent 
validation of impact assessment’). 
30 Report on Better Regulation in the European Union prepared by the Committee on Legal Affairs of the 
European Parliament (Rapporteur: Katalin Levai, 2007/2095(INI)) as a motion for a EP Resolution. See A6-
0273/2007, para 6. 
31 For example, in Spain v. Council (2006), the European Court of Justice held that failure to produce an IA to 
support a regulatory decision may lead to a violation of the ‘proportionality’ principle of EU law.  See Case C-
310/04, Kingdom of Spain v. Council of the European Union (2006) (holding that failure to conduct an IA 
might, in certain circumstances, be a breach of the proportionality principle), see Alemanno (2009). DRAFT — Not for quotation without permission   17 
 
   
legislation, whereas authority conferred by order of the president or prime minister may be 
confined to oversight within the executive branch, though this distinction itself depends on the 
constitutional structure of the government.  
 4.2  Tasks 
  Depending on their mandates, ROBs may perform a variety of functions or tasks. Neither 
OIRA’s nor IAB’s missions are limited to quality control. Although their priority task is to 
review the quality of impact assessments, they enjoy a larger array of powers. These include: 
  (a) Inhibiting undesirable policies 
  OIRA has sought to inhibit the adoption of undesirable policies since 1981 using return 
letters to the federal agencies.
32  Unlike OIRA, the IAB has no veto power over the IAs 
conducted by the Commission DGs. However, the IAB may ask the relevant DG to resubmit a 
revised version of the original IA.
33  Thus, while it is true that the IAB itself cannot veto a 
flawed IA draft, its (negative) opinion may produce some relevant, though indirect, effects on 
the outcome of the quality control process. In particular, the Secretariat-General may block an 
initiative if the IAB opinion has not been taken into account by the DG author of the IA. This 
may occur to the extent the Secretariat-General, unlike the IAB, enjoys this sort of veto 
power.  
The question is then how far may ROBs go in inhibiting undesirable policies. OIRA can 
issue return letters, but under the EO, the agency can then appeal to a more senior 
administration official (such as the Vice President or the White House Chief of Staff). Can the 
ROB go to court, or be challenged in court?  In the US, courts usually do not enforce 
Presidential executive orders against executive agencies, but they will require agencies to 
abide by Congressional statutes, which may affect regulatory oversight in various directions 
(including enforcing legislative requirements to conduct IA, enforcing legislative prohibitions 
on some types of analysis, and enforcing legislative time limits on agency action 
notwithstanding ongoing OIRA review). As for the EU, the European Courts may be starting 
to enforce such requirements.
34  Indeed, despite the Commission's efforts to dismiss any 
attempt to legalize the Better Regulation requirements, these requirements, by dictating a 
more informed and more inclusive method of decision-making, are expected to influence 
public expectations, thus encouraging stakeholders to act in order to ensure their 
implementation by the Commission. Not only are private parties willing to challenge the 
                                                 
32 Executive Order 12866. See, in particular, section 6(b). 
33 See IA Guidelines 2009, p. 10.  
34 Case C-310/04, Kingdom of Spain v. Council of the European Union (2006) (holding that failure to conduct 
an IA is a breach of the proportionality principle), see Alemanno (2009).  DRAFT — Not for quotation without permission   18 
 
   
correctness of IAs carried out by the Commission services but it may be that the ECJ is ready 
to rely on IAs to determine a possible breach of a general principle of law, such as the 
principle of proportionality (Alemanno 2009). 
 (b)  Promoting  desirable  policies 
  OIRA began to issue ‘prompt’ letters to promote desirable new policies in 2001.
35  
Rather than being sent in response to the regulators' submission of a draft rule for ROB 
review, a ‘prompt’ letter is sent on the ROB's own initiative, and contains a suggestion for 
how the regulator (be it an agency or a DG) could improve its regulations. The prompt letter, 
at least as developed by OIRA, does not mandate agency action; it only suggests a prima facie 
case for action based on an initial benefit-cost assessment showing that such new agency 
action could increase net benefits. For example, one of OIRA’s first prompt letters was to the 
US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), asking FDA to consider a new rule requiring the 
listing of trans-fat content on the nutrition labels on packaged foods.  
Yet the issuance of prompt letters by OIRA has been episodic and ad hoc. There is not 
yet a system in place to help OIRA generate prompt letters as routinely as OIRA currently 
reviews agency proposals and potentially issues return letters. One option would be an 
external advisory body to OIRA, or a new panel of the National Academy of Sciences, or 
both, that would generate candidate prompt letters.
36  An interagency working group could 
play a similar role. Another option would permit nongovernmental organizations to appeal to 
OIRA to issue a prompt letter if an agency denies a rulemaking petition (Revesz and 
Livermore 2008). 
In Europe, the IAB’s Mandate and Rules of Procedure also speak of ‘prompt’ letters, but, 
unlike in the US context, they are prompts to conduct an IA, not to develop a regulation.
37 
The current blanket application of IAs to all items on the Commission’s Work Program 
(CLWP) does not necessarily cover all proposals with the most significant impacts.
38 Hence 
prompt letters might have the potential to fill this gap. Following the establishment of the 
IAB, the Secretariat-General is in charge of identifying as early as possible items that are not 
included in the CLWP, but which could benefit from IA. When the IAB shares the opinion of 
                                                 
35 OIRA has issued several prompt letters to agencies in this way since 2001.  For more about the genesis and 
rationale of this device, see Graham 2007.  OIRA posts its prompt letters online at  http://www.reginfo.gov 
/public/jsp/EO/promptLetters.jsp 
36 See Committee of Past Presidents, Society for Risk Analysis (SRA), Recommendations to OMB on 
Regulatory Review, March 16, 2009, Recommendation number 7, p.9, available at 
http://sra.org/OMB_regulatory_review.php . 
37 IAB Mandate, point 4 and Article 6 of the IAB Rules. 
38 Thus, for instance, among the initiatives which are not a priori subject to IA, there are non-priority list CLWP 
items and certain implementing measures such as comitology decisions. DRAFT — Not for quotation without permission   19 
 
   
the Secretariat-General, it may prompt, though not require, the relevant department to 
undertake an IA.  
(c) Information burdens and quality 
  The ROB may also oversee the administrative burden of governmental requests for 
information. This was the objective of the US Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 that created 
OIRA, and the original reason for the ‘I’ in OIRA. It is also the objective of the efforts at 
Administrative Burden Reduction by many European governments. Meanwhile, the ROB may 
also oversee the quality of information produced by government agencies, as under the US 
Information Quality Act of 2001.
39   
(d) Capacity building 
  Both OIRA and the IAB are instructed to help agencies and DGs to perform better IAs. 
In particular, they may perform this task by issuing guidelines on how to conduct IA
40 and 
also engage in early collaboration to shape the rule toward increasing net benefits – not just 
waiting to receive the proposed rule and then critiquing it.
41  
 
5. Rules of procedure  
  To fully exercise its tasks and discharge its mandate, any oversight body must act within 
the framework of a set of procedural rules. The specific rules of procedure of a ROB can be 
important in determining its effectiveness, quality, and perceived legitimacy (Rose-Ackerman 
1995). US OMB/OIRA follows rules of procedure established in EO 12866, including rules 
regarding the timetable to review agency IAs, the transparency of OIRA’s contacts with 
outside parties, and the opportunity for an agency to appeal an OIRA decision. EO 12866 
(Sept. 1993) replaced the earlier EO 12291 (Feb. 1981), and significantly changed OIRA’s 
rules of procedure, notably by requiring much greater transparency. The European 
Commission’s IAB has rules of procedure issued in early 2007, governing the composition 
and voting of the five-member IAB, the timing of reviews of IAs, transparency of IAB 
deliberations, and sources of internal and external expertise. In addition, US OMB has 
guidelines for impact assessment, mainly in Circular A-4, Sept. 2003, as does the European 
IAB, mainly in its IA Guidelines of Jan.15, 2009. OIRA also issued guidelines for good risk 
analysis (jointly with Office of Science and Technology Policy - OSTP, in September 2007). 
                                                 
39  Information Quality Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, codified at 44 U.S.C. 3516 (Note) (directing 
OMB to issue guidelines that ‘provide policy and procedural guidance to Federal agencies for ensuring and 
maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information … disseminated by Federal agencies’).  
OMB issued its guidelines in December 2001, see 67 Fed. Reg. 8452 (republication of Feb. 22, 2002). 
40 See OIRA Circular A-4 (Sept. 2003), and the EU IAB Mandate 2005, point 6. 
41 See Graham (2007);  IA Guidelines 2009:10; IA Rules of procedure, Art. 5.3. DRAFT — Not for quotation without permission   20 
 
   
  5.1 Leadership of the ROB: number and affiliation 
  US OIRA is headed by a single Administrator, who is assisted by career staff members. 
By contrast, the EU IAB is a five-member board, chaired by the Deputy Secretary-General 
responsible for regulatory matters, with four additional members who are senior officials of 
key DGs.
42 The IAB’s rules say that its members are supposed ‘to act independently of the 
policy making departments’ notwithstanding its members’ affiliation of origin.
43 This might 
seem odd to the extent that, besides the Deputy Secretary General who chairs it, the board’s 
other four members are appointed by the Directors General heading the DGs to which these 
four IAB members belong. In other words, they are appointed to a body to oversee the DGs 
by their own bosses at the DGs.
44  Yet, perhaps surprisingly, during its first four years of 
activity, the IAB has been perceived as reasonably impartial and independent. One may 
venture to suggest that the main driving force behind this positive development is a 
reputational factor: IAB members know that their professional future is linked to the success 
of the IAB; hence they have an incentive to defend their own name and expertise by 
privileging an impartial and consistent approach in analyses rather than acting to favir their 
home DGs. 
It remains to be seen whether a five-member board can operate effectively to review IAs, 
compared to OIRA’s single Administrator (irrespective of the home affiliations of the IAB 
members). The IAB’s self-evaluation in early 2008 sought to allay these concerns. The audit 
exercise by the European Court of Auditors on the EU IA system, which is currently ongoing, 
is expected to provide some recommendations on the IAB’s institutional membership.
45 
  5.2 Time to review 
  In the US OIRA, the time for review extends up to 90 days from the receipt of a proposed 
rule. In the EU IAB, the time to review extends at least 30 days before inter-service 
consultation begins. Too short a time period may make meaningful review of complex IAs 
difficult or impossible. But too long a time period may impose unwarranted delay on needed 
new rules and may undermine morale. In the US in the late 1990s, a significant number of 
proposed rules had waiting times longer than 90 days. In 2001 and 2002, OIRA made 
                                                 
42 For a critique of the actual IAB membership, see Alemanno (2008:70). 
43 COM(2006) 689, 8. 
44 See Article 1, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Procedures. 
45 Council of the European Union, Conclusions of the Competitiveness Council on Better Regulation, December 
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substantial progress in reducing the time for review below 90 days.
46 In 2008, the IAB has 
uploaded its opinions on time in almost 80% of the cases.
47 
  5.3 Who can participate in review 
  The EU IAB rules expressly allow the IAB to solicit advice from outside experts. OIRA 
can receive communications from parties outside government (so long as they are identified in 
its docket), but does not seem to have the standard practice of soliciting advice from outside 
experts. Both the IAB and OIRA have processes of inter-service (or interagency) consultation 
on proposed rules. 
  5.4 Opportunity for the regulatory agency to be heard and to hear critiques 
  EO 12866 calls for the agency proposing the rule to be invited to have a representative 
present whenever OIRA staff meet with an outside party about the rule. Under the IAB rules 
of procedure, during the meeting between the IAB and the author DG, the latter is represented 
by the head of the relevant unit and a support official. 
  5.5 Appeals to higher authority 
  EO 12866 provided that disputes over a return letter could be appealed to a cabinet-level 
committee chaired by the Vice President. Under the George W. Bush administration, this 
responsibility was shifted from the Vice President to the President’s Chief of Staff. In the EU, 
a DG may appeal to the full Commission from an IAB opinion or Secretariat-General 
decision.  
  5.6 Influence of statutory deadlines 
  In the US, a statutory deadline or a court-ordered deadline for rulemaking will force the 
agency to act (e.g., to publish a rule) even if OIRA has not yet completed its review. A similar 
constraint does not exist in the EU, where IA is not mandatory, being contained not in statutes 
but in soft law acts, such as guidelines,
48 and where some IAs are conducted regarding the 
Commission’s proposals for legislation which have no time deadline. 
  5.7 Public access to information about the review 
  Rules of procedure not only dictate each stage of the examination undertaken by the 
ROB, but also introduce transparency requirements. In the US agency rulemaking is already 
public, pursuant to the APA, with notices of proposed rulemaking, proposed rules, and final 
rules all published in the Federal Register and now also online. EO 12866 added transparency 
provisions to ensure public awareness of the OIRA process, including a record of those who 
                                                 
46  See GAO (2003), supra. 
47 Impact Assessment Board Report for 2008 (2008:9). 
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met with OIRA regarding each rule. During the George W. Bush administration, in contrast to 
efforts to withhold information in some other parts of the administration, OIRA went further 
than required by EO 12866 and posted all of its return letters, prompt letters, guidelines, and 
almost all other important documents on its public web site.
49  
In the EU, the location of IAB review in the regulatory process limits the transparency of 
its activities. Article 16 of the IAB Rules of Procedure seems to ensure transparency to the 
extent that it requires the Board to make available its draft agendas, meeting records, 
opinions, prompt-letters, and notes signed by the Chair on behalf of the IAB as quickly as 
possible to all Commission departments. At the same time, it ensures public access to the 
Board's documents by subjecting them to principles and conditions as laid down in Regulation 
1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission 
documents
 50. Although all IAB opinions must be available to all Commission services,
51 they 
are released, through a publication on the IAB page within the Europa website, only when the 
Commission has adopted the corresponding proposal. This is automatically done by the IAB 
as the sole owner of its opinions. If the IAB opinions were to become public before the final 
adoption of the Commission proposal, this would lead to a situation in which an IAB opinion 
on a draft IA would be disclosed before the Commission proposal itself, thus inevitably 
disclosing the contents of the latter. However, the lack of publication of the draft IA report 
combined with the delayed disclosure of its final version make it difficult to determine, after 
the fact, the exact object and influence of the IAB review This may only be inferred by 
reading the published final IA report from the DG, in the light of the suggestions contained 
within the IAB opinion. 
 
6. Scope of oversight 
  ROBs may address a wide array of regulatory activities including proposals for new 
regulations, the stock of existing regulations, proposals for new statutes and legislative acts, 
information requests, and others.  They may oversee the full span of government actors, or 
only a subset. 
  6.1. Timing: ex ante and ex post 
  Most ROBs focus mainly on the flow of new regulations while giving less attention to 
the existing stock of rules. Thus, both US OIRA and EU IAB focus on ex ante impact 
                                                 
49  See the OIRA website at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/regulatory_affairs/default/ , the OIRA Regulatory 
Matters website at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_regmatters/ , and GAO (2003), supra. 
50 Regulation 2001/1049 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001, OJ L 145, p. 43. 
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assessment of new regulations, with only occasional attention to the stock of existing rules, or 
to retrospective ex post IAs of previously adopted rules. Yet, ex post review would be useful 
to identify needed policy revisions, and to assess and improve the accuracy of ex ante IAs 
(Wiener 2006, Harrington et al. 2000). 
  6.2  Administrative costs 
  Some ROBs do focus on the burden of existing rules and are less concerned with new 
regulations. Countries that have sought to reduce administrative burdens have taken this 
approach. Many employ the Standard Cost Model (SCM), compliance cost evaluations, 
‘simplification,’ and ‘regulatory budgets’ to reduce paperwork burdens. The Netherlands has 
been a leader in this area (OECD 2007b), but the UK has also made major strides in reducing 
administrative burdens on the private sector.
52 
  Despite the widespread enthusiasm for cutting red tape, it is not always obvious that 
cutting administrative burdens is desirable. Subjecting administrative burdens to a benefit-cost 
test (as for other regulations) would be superior to simply enforcing arbitrary burden 
reduction targets. Information-based regulations can be warranted in some cases (OECD 
2007b, Wiener 2006:500-01). The European Commission recognised this in its revised IA 
Guidelines on 15 March 2006, stating in Box 11 that:  
‘The fact that one option would impose lower administrative costs is not in itself a 
sufficient reason to prefer it. For example, a measure . . . likely to impose relatively 
fewer administrative costs [by mandating specific technical standards, instead of 
requiring labels that disclose product data] . . . could give manufacturers less 
flexibility and could reduce consumer choice, [so that] its overall costs may be higher 
than the ‘administrative’ requirement to display data . . .’.   
Information collection and disclosure rules, such as product labelling, the US Toxics Release 
Inventory, and similar pollution discharge registries, may be especially cost-effective ways to 
protect society (Hamilton 2005; Sand 2010).  
  6.3 Topical areas of regulation 
  In principle, an ROB could oversee all regulation, covering all topics. In practice, ROBs 
often focus only on one type of regulation, such as rules imposing administrative burdens 
(information collection costs). ROBs often focus on health, safety, security and environmental 
regulations (sometimes called ‘social regulation’ or ‘risk regulation’) while sometimes having 
curtailed powers or less emphasis in the area of banking, finance, competition, trade, and 
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other ‘economic regulation.’ In some countries sensitive areas such as defence or 
taxation/fiscal policy (Mexico for example) are exempt from the review process.  
  Expanding the ROB’s scope could bring the benefits of oversight to those areas and 
could also help correct the misimpression that oversight tools, such as benefit-cost analysis, 
are biased against the subjects of their current narrow application. For example, extending 
benefit-cost analysis beyond social regulation to cover economic regulation and government-
funded projects would help demonstrate that benefit-cost analysis need not be biased against 
health or the environment. Benefit-cost analysis would then be deployed to assess 
environmentally damaging projects such as dams, deforestation and power plants – as it had 
been in its early uses decades ago (Kneese 2000, Hufschmidt 2000).
53 Early in the modern 
environmental movement, benefit-cost analysis was seen as a useful tool for environmental 
protection when applied to evaluate projects in the US and elsewhere.
54 At the same time, 
expanding the scope of oversight could stretch ROBs’ capacity, and could bring ROBs into 
conflict with other institutions already active in those areas.  
  In the US, OIRA has emphasized impact assessment of proposed new regulations 
addressing health, safety, and environmental risks. Over the last several years (at least since 
Sept. 11, 2001) it began to address proposed new regulations of homeland security risks as 
well. On a related front, OIRA could expand its mandate to oversee international treaty 
commitments (via impact assessments); the US State Department has recently proposed 
requiring agencies to consult with OMB/OIRA on the regulatory impacts of pending new 
international agreements,
55 and the State Department already requires agencies to consult with 
OMB before making new budgetary commitments in international agreements.
56 In Europe, 
many ROBs at the national level consider the national impact of proposed EU wide policies.  
ROBs could extend their role further, addressing existing as well as new regulations. They 
could address decisions not to regulate, or to deregulate, as well as to regulate,
57 and also 
assess economic policies and projects. For example, a US statute, section 201 of the Trade 
                                                 
53   See the Federal Flood Control Act of 1936 (requiring that the ‘benefits to whomsoever they may accrue are in 
excess of the estimated costs,’ 33 USC § 701(a)). 
54   See e.g. Berkman and Viscusi (1973) (using BCA to critique federal dams); Calvert Cliffs Co-ordinating 
Committee v AEC, 449 F 2d 1109 (DC Cir 1971) (finding that the Environmental IA provision in NEPA section 
102(2)(C) requires benefit-cost analysis of federal projects such as nuclear power plants, in order to take into 
account their previously neglected environmental costs), cert denied, 404 US 942 (1972). 
55  71 Fed Reg 28831 (18 May 2006). 
56  See 22 CFR § 181.4(e). 
57  See Revesz & Livermore (2008).  This may already be the practice at OIRA. DRAFT — Not for quotation without permission   25 
 
   
Act of 1974, 19 USC 2251(a), already calls for benefit-cost analysis of trade measures, but 
this law has not been implemented by OIRA.
58  
  Another area of potential expanded scope for regulatory oversight is the banking, finance 
and insurance sector, as well as fiscal policies. In many countries, these policies are handled 
in a separate way and are not subject to regulatory quality oversight. For example, in the US, 
fiscal spending and taxation policy has traditionally been handled by the budget side of OMB 
(and at the CBO), whereas OIRA is on the management side. Banking and finance regulatory 
agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Department of the 
Treasury, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Comptroller of the 
Currency, and the Federal Reserve Bank have not been subject to regular OIRA oversight, 
although policies of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which 
governs among other things the mortgage loans made by Fannie Mae, have been subject to 
OIRA review. The mortgage and credit crisis of 2008-2010, and the dramatic move to 
restructure banking and financial markets to rescue the economy from this crisis in the US and 
Europe, suggest that past choices by markets and regulators have been suboptimal, to say the 
least. This implies that this area could benefit from oversight on benefit-cost criteria by 
ROBs.  
  6.4 Types of legal action  
  ROBs differ in the type of legal action they oversee. This may include legislation, 
rulemaking, guidance documents and other avenues. Under section 3(b) of EO 12866, US 
OIRA oversight is limited to regulations promulgated by federal executive agencies. From 
January 2007 to January 2009, EO 13422 added review of guidance documents issued by 
these same agencies. By contrast, in Europe, the IA Guidelines and IAB oversight apply to 
legislation proposed by the European Commission, and indeed to all matters in the 
Commission’s annual Legislative and Work Programme (CLWP).
59 The nature of the US 
institutional system, with its separation of powers, precludes OIRA review from being 
meaningfully extended to cover legislation (although the executive branch could prepare IAs 
of pending legislation as a way to influence legislators or to inform the president’s veto 
decisions). Perhaps a new ROB, attached to the Congress, could be established to supervise 
                                                 
58 See on this point, Review of the application of EU and US Regulatory Impact Assessment Guidelines on the 
Analysis of Impacts on International Trade and Investment, Final Report and Conclusion, prepared by the OMB 
and Secretariat-General of the EU Commission, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/regulatory_matters_pdf/sg-omb_final.pdf . 
59  Some important decisions handled through ‘comitology’ may fall outside this scope of review, but the IAB is 
expressly authorised to reach out with a prompt letter to identify such decisions warranting an IA. See IAB 
Mandate, point 4, at http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/docs/key_docs/iab_mandate_annex_sec_2006 
_1457_3.pdf  DRAFT — Not for quotation without permission   26 
 
   
impact assessment of legislation proposed in the Congress. To the extent that agency 
regulations warrant oversight, in many cases a large share of their costs and benefits derive 
from the underlying legislation impelling the agency to issue that regulation. As noted above, 
CBO estimates the fiscal impacts of new laws on government spending and revenues, but 
does not focus on private costs and benefits. This underlines the need for IA and oversight of 
regulatory quality within legislatures  In many countries, finding an oversight mechanism to 
enable Parliament to conduct and heed impact assessments on its own legislative proposals, 
and ex post assessments of laws already enacted, could help fill significant gaps. The adoption 
of such a mechanism would, however, face political obstacles because it threatens to make 
transparent the distribution of costs and benefits posed by legislation. It is interesting to 
observe that a debate is currently under way in the EU on whether the scope of regulatory 
oversight should be narrowed because the current regime is suffering from its own success in 
producing too many IAs. 
  6.5 Selection of which regulations to review 
  Any ROB with limited oversight resources (staff, funding, time) must have some criteria 
for selecting which regulations to review. Most of the cost of conducting IAs falls on the 
agencies or DGs that wish to promulgate rules, because they prepare the initial IAs which the 
ROB (OIRA or the IAB) then reviews. But the ROB must also have the capacity, and some 
selection or triage mechanism, to use its own scarce resources effectively. 
In the US, section 3(f) of EO 12866 makes the cut by using a threshold of the magnitude of 
impact, requiring an IA for any regulation imposing $100 million or more in impacts. In 2003, 
OIRA added the criterion that any regulation posing an impact exceeding $1 billion should be 
accompanied by an IA using formal probabilistic scenarios to assess its impacts.  
The European Commission takes a different approach. Under its IA Guidelines, it employs the 
concept of ‘proportionate analysis,’ meaning that the degree of analysis should be greater 
where the potential impacts of the regulation are larger. This approach avoids the sharp 
disjunctions and potential estimation errors or agencies’ efforts to avoid review by 
undercounting impacts to come under the dollar-value thresholds used in the US. OIRA and 
the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) endorsed the concept of proportionate 
analysis in 2007, saying ‘The depth or extent of the analysis of the risks, benefits and costs 
associated with a decision should be commensurate with the nature and significance of the 
decision.’
60  
                                                 
60 OMB/OIRA and OSTP Memorandum on Updated Principles of Risk Analysis, Sept. 19, 2007, p. 4. DRAFT — Not for quotation without permission   27 
 
   
  6.6 Analytic methods 
  As discussed above, ROBs can employ a variety of analytic methods in their reviews, 
and can ask agencies to use these methods in their regulatory IAs. Statutory restrictions 
sometimes limit the type of analysis that an agency may use in making its regulatory 
decisions. For example, in the US, Congress has in some statutes required (or the courts so 
infer from statutory language) agencies to use benefit-cost analysis in developing rules, but in 
some other statutes Congress has forbidden agencies to use benefit-cost analysis. One 
example is the setting of national ambient air quality standards under section 109 of the Clean 
Air Act, where the courts have held that the statute forbids EPA to consider cost.
61 In such 
cases, the agency still prepares an impact assessment using benefit-cost analysis for OIRA 
review under the EO, but the agency is not supposed to refer to or base its decisions on that 
analysis when it sets standards in the rule itself.
62. In the early 1990s, Congress considered but 
did not enact a law including a ‘supermandate’ to require benefit-cost analysis in all major 
rulemakings notwithstanding prior statutory restrictions on such analysis. A different option 
would be a legislative ‘superauthorization,’ permitting but not requiring agencies to use 
benefit-cost analysis in major rules notwithstanding prior statutory restrictions on such 
analysis. This approach was taken by Congress in one statute, the 1996 amendments to the 
Safe Drinking Water Act, but has not yet been employed more broadly. In effect, a 
superauthorization of the analytic methods used in impact assessment would stand for a 
straightforward idea: Let the regulators think things through.  
  In the EU, where legislation is initiated by the Commission, and the Commission has 
committed itself to conduct impact assessments, there are no restrictions in particular pieces 
of legislation on the use of impact assessments. The EU Commission’s IA Guidelines require 
analysis of ‘positive and negative impacts’, without imposing though any specific 
methodology. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 
191, expressly calls for analysis of benefits and costs only in setting environmental standards. 
As a result, the IA conducted by DG Environment on the Clean Air for Europe (CAFÉ) policy 
– the EU counterpart of the US EPA’s ambient air quality standards – was an extensive 




                                                 
61  See Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., 531 U.S. 457 (2001).  Separate from section 109, some other 
parts of the Clean Air Act allow EPA to consider costs. 
62  See Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., 531 U.S. 457, 471 n.4 (2001). 
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7. Conclusions  
  As governments around the globe become increasingly conscious of the need for better 
policy making, they establish Regulatory Oversight Bodies and entrust these bodies with the 
mandate to supervise the quality of regulatory analysis and action. As our review of US and 
EU practice has shown, an ROB must be designed to suit the constitutional framework within 
which it is institutionally housed and also the philosophy of the regulatory improvement 
initiative that motivates its existence. Thus, the salient differences between OIRA in the US 
and IAB in Europe derive in part from the different US and EU constitutional contexts, and 
from the different purposes of their respective IA systems. Impact assessment in the US and 
the EU is conducted and reviewed at different stages in the process, with different powers and 
limitations, and for different purposes. In the US, Congress instructs agencies to regulate; the 
President then requires agencies to conduct IAs to accompany proposed rules, and empowers 
OIRA, a body created by statute, to oversee rules and to review the regulatory IAs. In the EU, 
IAs are conducted on a voluntary basis by the Commission, on all its policy and legislative 
proposals, and largely for its internal use; the IAs are then reviewed by the IAB within the 
Commission. As a result, whereas IA serves as an executive branch check on the exercise of 
legislatively delegated powers in the US system, it functions as a support for proposed 
legislation in the EU.  
These features explain in part why the IAB appears to be a weaker regulatory gatekeeper 
than OIRA. The US oversight body, having been conceived as a watchdog on legislative 
(Congressional) pressure on agencies to regulate, was designed with a single head and 
entrusted with the power to issue return letters on proposed rules or IAs. It has since begun to 
issue ‘prompt’ letters to spur beneficial new policies (rather than only checking proposals by 
the agencies). By contrast, the IAB, having been entrusted with improving the quality of 
legislative proposals, has an internal, multi-member, institutionally-dependent representative 
board whose powers are mainly the ability to recommend that an IA should be redone and 
resubmitted to the IAB, and to communicate its views to the collegial Commission. Indeed, 
lacking veto power, the IAB cannot block, as could OIRA, a DG draft IA or a policy proposal. 
Although the IAB appears by comparison with OIRA to be a weaker regulatory oversight 
body, its role is amplified when seen in the context of the overall quality control mechanisms 
within the Commission.
64  The IAB opinions may affect the policy outcome if they are 
invoked at the end of the review process by the Secretariat-General (or by a member of the 
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Commission, or another EU institution) to question the underlying policy initiative. 
Moreover, the mere existence of the IAB seems to encourage DGs to better prepare their IAs 
to avoid a negative opinion. More broadly, the general availability of IAB opinions may 
encourage and support objections raised by concerned stakeholders or other institutions. The 
IAB may be exercising a sort of ‘soft power’ within the existing oversight system. Although 
the long-term indirect effects of the IAB opinions are difficult to predict, it is likely that these 
opinions will strengthen the overall effectiveness of the quality review system. The European 
regulatory oversight body seems designed to provide compliance incentives for the actors 
involved in the regulatory oversight process, consistent with the view that ‘to be effective, a 
system of regulation must create compliance incentives for regulated parties, rather than rely 
on corrective action and oversight.’ (Elliott 1994).  
Nevertheless, though the IAB has the potential to become the main ‘regulatory 
gatekeeper’ within the EU quality control system, it does not yet have the explicit authority to 
return or to prompt policy proposals. Moreover, it does not currently appear to be adequately 
equipped to undertake technically sophisticated reviews of DGs’ IAs or policy proposals, 
mainly due to: (a) the lack of effective rules ensuring the independence of IAB members; (b) 
too few resources to effectively undertake its mission; (c) a scarcity of staff with technical 
expertise in impact assessment methodologies and in other disciplines relevant to the 
oversight activities; (d) the lack of retrospective evaluations to improve on the quality of its 
own opinions; and (e) insufficient time to conduct careful reviews. While there is no doubt 
that the current IAB's members are among the best IA experts among high-level officials 
within the Commission departments, the current appointment rules do not seem to ensure that 
this result will be attained in the future. At the same time, the IAB should take advantage of 
its opportunities to seek both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ expertise, and it should develop its own 
technical capabilities through the appointment of specialized staff in the field of economic, 
environmental and social impact assessment in order to strengthen its in-house expertise and, 
simultaneously, enhance its independence from the DGs it oversees.  
Meanwhile, OIRA has been equipped with the explicit authority and expert staff to carry 
out its traditional reviews and ‘return’ letters in response to ex ante IAs on agency proposals. 
In recent years, OIRA has moved to broaden its scope toward: earlier involvement with the 
agency in developing a sound proposal; later ex post reviews of IAs to improve policies and 
improve assessment methods; ‘prompt’ letters that promote good regulation; and oversight of 
a wider array of types of regulation. The new EO anticipated from President Obama may 
point OIRA to new directions, roles, and analytic methods. DRAFT — Not for quotation without permission   30 
 
   
  The emergence of ROBs in both the US and, more recently, the EU, demonstrates the 
new transatlantic consensus on the desirability of regulatory oversight, at least at the centers 
of government. An open question deserving further study is how effective the ROBs are at 
improving the quality of IAs and of regulatory policies. Does ‘better regulation’ actually yield 
better regulation?
65  Each polity can now learn from the other’s experience to improve its 
performance. Where differences or disagreements arise, those can be addressed through 
dialogue and through careful comparison. Differences can be sources of insight and learning 
if their impacts are monitored, evaluated and shared over time. In that way, the US and EU 
can use the parallel development of their ROBs to engage in a ‘transatlantic policy laboratory’ 
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